The Revised IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration by Voser, Nathalie & Petti, Angelina M.
 6 33 ASA BULLETIN 1/2015 (MARCH) 
The Revised IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest 
in International Arbitration 
NATHALIE VOSER1, ANGELINA M PETTI2/3 
 
I.  Introduction 7 
II.  General Principle of the Guidelines and their Scope of 
Application 10 
III.  The 2014 Guidelines v the 2004 Guidelines: What is new, 
what remains the same, and what has been clarified?  12 
IV.  Overview of the 2014 Guidelines by Topic 15 
A.  Disclosure Responsibilities of Arbitrators and 
Administrative Secretaries 15 
a)  Standard for disclosure 15 
b)  Relevance of disclosures and non-disclosures 16 
c)  Advance waivers and their impact on an arbitrator’s 
duty of disclosure 17 
B.  Disclosure Responsibilities of Parties 18 
a)  Duty to reveal information of an existing 
relationship 18 
b)  Duty to reveal names of members of counsel and 
relationship to arbitrator 19 
C.  Duty to Conduct Reasonable Enquiries 19 
a)  Duty of the arbitrators 19 
b)  Duty of the parties 21 
D.  Conflicts Based on Relationships between Parties/Counsel 
and Arbitrators 22 
                                                     
1  Nathalie Voser is a partner in Schellenberg Wittmer’s Dispute Resolution Group in Zurich 
and co-heads the firm’s arbitration team. She was the Rapporteur of the IBA Working Group 
on Conflicts of Interest which led to the 2004 Guidelines, and also a member of the 2012 – 
2014 Subcommittee on Conflicts of Interest.  
2  Angelina M Petti, LL.M., is a senior associate in Schellenberg Wittmer’s Zurich office and 
a member of the firm’s Dispute Resolution Group. She is admitted to the New York State 
Bar and is a Solicitor of England and Wales. 
3  The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent 
the views of, and should not be attributed to, the IBA, the Conflicts of Interest Subcommittee 
formed by the IBA Arbitration Committee, and/or Schellenberg Wittmer. 
N. VOSER, A. M PETTI, THE REVISED IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST  
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
33 ASA BULLETIN 1/2015 (MARCH) 7 
a)  Repeat appointments as arbitrator or engagements 
of an arbitrator (or his/her law firm) 22 
b)  Third-party funding, insurers and indemnifiers 24 
c)  Enmity between the arbitrator and the parties and/or 
counsel 26 
d)  Relationship as co-counsel 26 
e)  Arbitrator and ties to appointing authority 27 
f)  Relationship through social groups or social media 27 
g)  Relationship through academia, conferences or 
seminars 28 
h)  Relationship with partner of the same firm as 
arbitrator 29 
i)  Relationship between barristers of the same 
chambers 29 
E.  Conflicts Based on Subject Matter (“Issue Conflicts”) 30 
F.  Waivers of Conflicts of Interest 32 
a)  Non-waivable issues 33 
b)  Waivable issues if waiver expressly made 33 
c)  Waivable issues even if waiver implicitly made 34 
V.  Concluding Remarks 34 
 Summary 36 
I. Introduction 
The independence and impartiality of arbitrators is a cornerstone to the 
arbitration process: it is one of the fundamental pillars for the legitimacy of 
arbitration as a private adjudication system and it is indispensable in order to 
maintain the confidence of its users. In recent years, and in the aftermath of the 
success and the growth in numbers of investment-treaty arbitrations, the issue 
of arbitrator neutrality has become even more important in international 
arbitration. Therefore, it is essential to set certain criteria which are 
internationally accepted. 
The IBA recognized the significance of the issue of conflicts of interest 
early in the last decade and the 2004 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest 
in International Arbitration (the “2004 Guidelines”) have given parties, 
arbitrators, institutions and courts standards to rely on when called upon to deal 
with issues of impartiality, independence, disclosure, objections and 
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challenges of arbitrators. The aim of the 2004 Guidelines was to uniform how 
such questions were to be dealt with by the arbitration community. It was also 
the goal of the 2004 Guidelines to set a balance between full transparency, on 
the one side, and unnecessary disclosures, on the other side, since excessive 
disclosures both hinder the arbitration process and impede a party’s right to 
nominate an arbitrator of its choosing. This was done with the so-called “Green 
List” which enumerates certain situations that need not be disclosed.4  
The 2004 Guidelines have been a success. Not only have they been used 
by arbitration practitioners in their daily work, they have also been relied upon 
by the arbitral institutions and by State courts when developing case law 
addressing issues of arbitrator impartiality and independence.5  
In 2012, the IBA Arbitration Committee formed an expanded Conflicts 
of Interest Subcommittee (the “Subcommittee”) and entrusted the 
Subcommittee group with the review process of the 2004 Guidelines in view 
of their tenth anniversary in 2014. The International Bar Association approved 
the revisions in the form of the 2014 Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
                                                     
4  See Otto L O de Witt Wijnen, Nathalie Voser and Neomi Rao, Background Information on 
the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Business Law 
International (Vol. 5 No. 3, September 2004, 433-458), in which the term Green List is 
defined as “an enumeration of specific situations in which there is no appearance of a lack 
of impartiality and independence and so no conflict of interest”, p. 434. 
5  Court decisions in various jurisdictions have also referred to the 2004 Guidelines (see 
Belgian Case No R G 2007/AR/70, République de Pologne c/ Eureko BV et al, 26 (published 
in ASA Bull. 565 (2008)); English decision ASM Shipping Ltd v TTMI Ltd of England [2005] 
EWHC 2238 (Comm); German Case No 26 Sch 8/07; German Case No T 24488-06, Andres 
Jilken v Ericsson AB, 5 (published in Stockholm Int’l Arb Rev 167 (2007)); Swedish Case 
Korsnas Aktiebolag v AB Fortun Värme samägt med Stockholms stad, T 1565-09; Swiss 
Case No 4A_528/2007 (published in ASA Bull. 575 (2008) (where the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court held that the 2004 Guidelines are “a valuable working tool to contribute to 
the uniformization of standards in international arbitration in the area of conflicts of 
interests and as such this instrument should impact on the practice of the courts and the 
institutions administrating arbitration proceedings”); U.S. decision New Regency 
Productions, Inc., 501 F.3d at 1110). In addition, several ICSID arbitral tribunals have 
referred to the 2004 Guidelines in assessing arbitrator bias (see OPIC Karimum Corporation 
v Venezuela ICSID Case No. ARB/10/14, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Professor 
Philippe Sands, Arbitrator (5 May 2011), p. 48-49; Alpha Projecktholding GMBH v Ukraine 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Decision on Respondent’s Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator 
Dr. Yoram Turbowicz (19 March 2010), p. 56; Tidewater, Participaciones Inversiones 
Portuarias SARL v Gabon ICSID Case No. ARB/08/17, Decision on the Proposal to 
Disqualify an Arbitrator (12 November 2009); Hrvatska Electroprivreda v Slovenia ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/24, Decision on Disqualification (6 May 2008)).  
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International Arbitration (the “2014 Guidelines”) in late October 2014 at the 
occasion of the annual IBA Conference which was held in Tokyo.6 
In keeping with the approach taken with the 2004 Guidelines, the 
revisions have been based upon statutes and case law in jurisdictions of 
Subcommittee members, and upon the judgment and expertise of 
Subcommittee members. In addition, the revisers sought and considered the 
views of the users, arbitral institutions, etc., through a questionnaire circulated 
in 2012. There were over 150 participants completing the questionnaire and 
the result of the survey identified the material which should be the focus of the 
revision from the perspective of the arbitration community.  
Likewise, the same structure of the 2004 Guidelines is maintained in the 
2014 Guidelines, i.e., the seven General Standards expressing the underlying 
principles, and the three Practical Application lists containing over fifty 
specific factual circumstances intending to give hands-on guidance to their 
users. Also, as to their core content, the 2014 Guidelines are no different to the 
2004 Guidelines in that they try to strike an equilibrium between, on the one 
hand, the parties’ right to disclosures of situations that may reasonably call into 
question an arbitrator’s impartiality and independence and their right to a fair 
hearing, and, on the other hand, the parties’ right to select arbitrators of their 
choosing. Rather than bringing about a radical change, the main purpose of the 
revision was to update the 2004 Guidelines and align them with the 
developments of the past ten years. Although the 2014 Guidelines – as with 
the 2004 Guidelines – are not binding as such, they are intended as an 
expression of best practices in international arbitration.  
The present article first briefly explains the revision process. The 
content of the 2014 Guidelines is thereafter dealt with by topic areas which are 
often raised in this realm of the discussions on conflicts of interest in 
arbitration, and which were also to a considerable extent at the core of the 
discussion within the Subcommittee. In addition, the authors have also 
indicated what can be considered as the most important new additions to the 
2014 Guidelines, what has been reformulated from the 2004 Guidelines and 
what remains the same. Finally, the article also touches upon areas which – 
although discussed by the revision-makers – were chosen not to be thoroughly 
addressed in the revised guidelines.7 The aim of the present article is not only 
                                                     
6  http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_ materials.aspx 
7  Any references to “General Standards” include references to the General Standards as 
enumerated in the revised 2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest (“2014 Guidelines”). 
Any reference to the 2004 Guidelines and the numbering contained therein is made with an 
explicit citation to the 2004 IBA Guidelines on the Conflicts of Interest (“2004 Guidelines”). 
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to highlight those aspects of the 2014 Guidelines which are new or which 
modify the 2004 Guidelines, but also to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the guidelines as a whole.  
II. General Principle of the Guidelines and their Scope of 
Application 
The standard for arbitrators set forth in the 2004 Guidelines has 
remained intact and was reconfirmed with the 2014 revision. According to 
General Standard 1, the General Principle of the 2014 Guidelines is that 
“[e]very arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the parties at the 
time of accepting an appointment to serve and shall remain so until the final 
award has been rendered or the proceedings have otherwise finally 
terminated.” This standard has its origin in Article 12(2) of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration which contains almost 
identical language.8 The 2004 IBA Working Group on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration decided to accept the wording “impartiality or 
independence” as understood under Article 12(2) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law in recognition of the fact that any new definition thereof would only give 
rise to confusion.9 This standard for impartiality and independence is also 
reflected in almost all major institutional and ad hoc arbitration rules.10 
In order to identify conflicts of interest, the 2014 Guidelines put forward 
two tests which remain identical to those originally set forth in the 
2004 Guidelines:  
                                                     
Any term which is not defined in this article shall take on the same meaning as that set forth 
in the 2014 Guidelines.  
8  Article 12(2) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration reads as 
follows: “An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence, or if he does not possess 
qualifications agreed to by the parties. A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by 
him, or in whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of which he becomes 
aware after the appointment has been made.” 
9  See also Otto L O de Witt Wijnen, Nathalie Voser and Neomi Rao, “Background 
Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration”, in 
Business Law International (Vol. 5 No. 3, September 2004, 433-458), pp. 440-441. 
10  As regards institutional arbitration rules see inter alia Article 11(1) of the International 
Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration 2012 (ICC), Article 9(1) of the Swiss Rules of 
International Arbitration 2012, Article 14(1) of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Rules 
2010 (SCC), Article 5.3 of the London Chamber of International Arbitration Rules 2014 
(LCIA), Article 13(1) of the International Dispute Resolution Procedures of the American 
Arbitration Association Rules 2014. As regards ad hoc arbitration rules see UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 2010, Article 11.  
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– The so-called “subjective test” of General Standard 2(a) provides that 
an arbitrator shall decline to accept an appointment, or refuse to 
continue to act as an arbitrator, if he or she has any doubt to his or 
her ability to be impartial or independent.  
– The second type of test is the so-called “objective test” of General 
Standard 2(b), which specifies that an arbitrator shall decline to 
accept an appointment, or refuse to continue to act as an arbitrator, if 
facts of circumstances exist which, from the point of view of a 
reasonable third person having knowledge of such information, 
would give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality 
or independence.11  
Doubts as described in General Standard 2(b) are justifiable if a 
“reasonable third person, having knowledge of the relevant facts and 
circumstances, would reach the conclusion that there is a likelihood that the 
arbitrator may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case as 
presented by the parties in reaching his or her decision”.12 The only minor, but 
useful, addition introduced by the 2014 revision in this context is the 
clarification that any of the situations described in the non-waivable Red List 
by default give rise to “justifiable doubts” as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence.13 
Pursuant to General Standard 5(a), the guidelines apply equally to 
tribunal chairs, sole arbitrators and co-arbitrators, howsoever appointed (i.e. 
whether through party-appointment or through an arbitral institution).14 
Removed from the 2014 Guidelines – as no longer relevant in the context of 
international arbitration – is the allowance of “non-neutral” arbitrators even if 
permitted by the applicable arbitration rules and domestic law. 
General Standard 5(b) now also expressly provides that administrative 
secretaries, or assistants to the arbitral tribunal or an individual arbitrator, are 
bound by the same duty as arbitrators. This addition is an example of a 
clarification introduced by the 2014 Guidelines. It elevates to the level of a 
General Standard what had previously only been discussed in the explanatory 
section of the 2004 Guidelines.15 General Standard 5(b) incorporates what has 
been the general practice among arbitration practitioners. With this duty of 
                                                     
11  General Standard 2(b). 
12  General Standard 2(c). 
13  General Standard 2(d): “Justifiable doubts necessarily exist as to the arbitrator’s impartiality 
or independence in any of the situations described in the non-waivable Red List”. 
14  Removed from the 2014 Guidelines is the discussion of party-appointed arbitrators being 
non-neutral if permitted by arbitration rules and domestic laws. 
15  Explanation to General Standard 5 of the 2004 Guidelines.  
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independence and impartiality also comes a duty of disclosure on the part of 
administrative secretaries.16 Ultimately, however, it is the responsibility of the 
arbitral tribunal to ensure that such duties are respected.17  
During the revision process, the Subcommittee, as its predecessor with 
the 2004 Guidelines, asked itself whether there should be specific rules for 
different types of arbitrations, and in particular, for investment-treaty 
arbitrations. The Subcommittee revisited recital 5 of the 2004 Guidelines 
which made clear that the provisions were to apply equally to investment-treaty 
arbitrations as to commercial arbitrations.18 Ultimately during the revision 
process, the Subcommittee came to the conclusion that there should not be 
special rules for different types of arbitrations. This is due to the fact that the 
duty of impartiality and independence of arbitrators are common across the 
spectrum of arbitrations including both private commercial and investment-
treaty arbitrations. Thus, in the view of the Subcommittee, all arbitrations 
warrant the same treatment pursuant to the guidelines. In addition, investment-
treaty arbitrations can be held not only under the auspices of ICSID 
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) or NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement) but also under the rules of institutions whose 
caseload primarily derives from private commercial arbitrations such as the 
SCC, the LCIA, the ICC and UNCITRAL. If investment-treaty arbitrations 
were to be singled out – and separate guidelines or special rules within the 
guidelines were established for this particular sect of arbitration – then this 
would result in difficulties when applying the provisions of those institutional 
arbitration rules for the appointment or challenge of arbitrators.  
III. The 2014 Guidelines v the 2004 Guidelines:    
What is new, what remains the same, and what has been 
clarified?  
This section provides a summary reference point as to how the 
2014 Guidelines compare to their predecessor and the issues mentioned herein 
as such are discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
                                                     
16  Explanation to General Standard 5(b). 
17  General Standard 5(b). 
18  Recital 5 of the 2004 Guidelines: “Originally, the Working Group developed the Guidelines 
for international commercial arbitration. However, in light of the comments received, it 
realized that the Guidelines should equally apply to other types of arbitration, such as 
investment arbitrations (insofar as these may not be considered as commercial 
arbitrations).”  
N. VOSER, A. M PETTI, THE REVISED IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST  
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
33 ASA BULLETIN 1/2015 (MARCH) 13 
The result of the revision can be broken down into three categories:  
The first category covers those issues which have withstood the revision 
process and remain identical in the 2014 Guidelines. As identified above, what 
clearly has not changed is the General Principle which continues to require that 
impartiality and independence be owed by all arbitrators (whether co-arbitrator 
or president, whether in commercial or investment setting).19 In addition, the 
standard of “justifiable doubts” from the viewpoint of a reasonable third person 
is still used to determine whether a conflict exists.20 As well, the benchmark to 
measure whether disclosure by an arbitrator is necessary has not been altered 
as compared to the 2004 Guidelines, i.e. whether facts or circumstances exist, 
which, in the eyes of the parties, raise doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality 
and independence.21 Finally, in line with the 2004 Guidelines is the 
2014 Guidelines’ treatment of waivers of conflicts of interest.22 
The second category of the revision includes those topics which, 
although in substance remain the same as the 2004 Guidelines, have been 
revised and clarified in the 2014 Guidelines. These topics include the 
discussion as to the impartiality and independence of administrative secretaries 
and their respective disclosure responsibilities.23 Additional subjects not new 
but elucidated also include the extent of a party’s duty to disclose information 
of existing relationships24 and the duty of arbitrators and the parties to conduct 
reasonable enquiries.25 The 2014 Guidelines also shed further light on the 
treatment of relationships with partners of the same firm as the arbitrator or 
counsel for one of the parties26 as well as the treatment of barristers of the same 
chambers.27 
Lastly, the third category of the revision comprises of those issues which 
have for the first time been introduced with the 2014 Guidelines. What is new 
with the 2014 revision is the discussion of advance waivers, and in particular 
their impact on the duty of disclosure.28 Additionally, with the 2014 Guidelines 
                                                     
19  See section II above and discussion of General Standards 1 and 5(a). 
20  See section II above and discussion of General Standard 2(b). 
21  See section IV.A.a) below and discussion of General Standard 3(a). 
22  See section IV.F below and discussion of General Standards 4(a)-(d). 
23  See section II above and discussion of General Standard 5(b). 
24  See section IV.B.a) below and discussion of General Standard 7(a). 
25  See section IV.C below and discussion of General Standards 7(c) and (d). 
26  See section IV.D.h) below and discussion of General Standard 6(a). 
27  See section IV.D.i) below and discussion of General Standard 7(a), Explanation to General 
Standard 6(a), and Practical Application Orange List item 3.3.2. 
28  See section IV.A.c) below and discussion of General Standard 3(b). 
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there is now guidance on the topic of third-party funders and insurers.29 The 
2014 Guidelines also introduce a new duty on parties to reveal names of 
members of its counsel at the outset and throughout the proceedings.30 Finally, 
newly addressed with the revision, but still left for the most part open, is the 
topic of conflicts based on the subject matter in dispute, i.e. “issue conflicts”.31 
As with the 2004 Guidelines, aside from the General Standards, the 
2014 Guidelines also include three Practical Application lists covering many 
of the varied scenarios that commonly arise in practice. These lists reflect 
which situations represent a conflict of interest (Red List) or which, depending 
upon the specific facts, may be a potential conflict of interest (and at least 
require disclosure by the potential arbitrator) (Orange List), and situations that 
from an objective point of view cannot be considered to be a conflict of interest 
and do not require disclosure (Green List). The additions made to the Practical 
Application lists with the introduction of the 2014 Guidelines draw from 
practice by providing concrete examples concerning the relationship between 
the arbitrator and a party or its counsel (including e.g. the existence of enmity,32 
relationship as co-counsel,33 connection to the appointing authority,34 
membership in the same charitable organization or social media,35 and 
association through academia, conferences or seminars36). 
Overall, the 2014 revision puts greater emphasis on the updating of the 
General Standards (Part I of guidelines) than the Practical Application lists 
(Part II of the guidelines). Although the Practical Application lists do not 
purport to be comprehensive, in the opinion of the authors more could have 
been done to provide additional guidance for recurring situations. In any event, 
the changes to the Practical Application lists fall also into one of the three 
categories of the result of the revision set forth above (i.e. those which are 
unaltered, those which remain the same in substance but were clarified in 
wording, and those which are completely new as a result of the revision). 
                                                     
29  See sections IV.B.a) and IV.D.b) below and discussion of General Standards 6(b) and 7(a). 
30  See section IV.B.b) below and discussion of General Standard 7(b). 
31  See section IV.E below and discussion of Paragraph 6 of the introductory paragraphs to Part 
II of the 2014 Guidelines. 
32  See section IV.D.c) below and discussion of Practical Application Orange List item 3.3.7. 
33  See section IV.D.d) below and discussion of Practical Application Orange List item 3.3.9. 
34  See section IV.D.e) below and discussion of Practical Application Orange List item 3.5.3. 
35  See section IV.D.f) below and discussion of Practical Application Green List item 4.3.1, and 
Practical Application Green List item 4.4.4. 
36  See section IV.D.g) below and discussion of Practical Application Green List item 4.3.3, 
and Practical Application Green List item 4.3.4. 
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IV. Overview of the 2014 Guidelines by Topic 
A. Disclosure Responsibilities of Arbitrators and Administrative 
Secretaries 
a) Standard for disclosure 
Even if facts or circumstances exist which, from the perspective of the 
arbitrator (subjective test) or a reasonable third person (objective test), do not 
raise doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, arbitrators may 
nevertheless have a duty to disclose such information. This is due to the notion 
that parties have an interest in being fully informed of any facts or 
circumstances that may be relevant in their view irrespective of whether they 
per se result in a conflict of interest.37  
Based on this purpose, as set forth in the 2004 Guidelines, the 
2014 Guidelines provide that “[i]f facts or circumstances exist that may, in the 
eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence”, the arbitrator shall disclose such facts or circumstances prior 
to accepting his or her appointment, or as soon as he or she learns of such 
facts.38 Any doubt as to whether an arbitrator should make a disclosure should 
be resolved in favor of disclosure.39 This duty remains ongoing throughout the 
entire proceedings.40 
In summary, arbitrator disclosure requirements as applied by the 
Practical Application lists include the following:  
– Items on the non-waivable Red List per se raise justifiable doubts as 
to the arbitrator’s impartiality and/or independence, and as a 
consequence equate to a conflict of interest. Thus, an arbitrator 
should, if such circumstances are present, decline appointment or 
immediately resign. These facts or circumstances would therefore 
not be the subject of future disclosures as arbitrators cannot leave it 
to the parties to waive the conflicts arising of the facts and 
circumstances in such cases.  
                                                     
37  Explanation to General Standard 3(c) (“An arbitrator who has made a disclosure to the 
parties considers himself or herself to be impartial and independent of the parties […] the 
purpose of disclosure is to allow the parties to judge whether they agree with the evaluation 
of the arbitrator and, if they so wish, to explore the situation further”). 
38 General Standard 3(a). 
39  General Standard 3(d). 
40  General Standard 3(e). 
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– Items on the waivable Red List also raise justifiable doubts as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality and/or independence and, for the arbitrator 
to continue to act in his or her function, there must be a full disclosure 
of the conflict of interest and express agreement that the arbitrator 
may continue to serve despite the conflict of interest.41 
– Items on the Orange List require disclosure from an arbitrator since the 
facts and circumstances are considered by the drafters as those which 
would give rise to doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality and/or 
independence from the perspective of parties. Pursuant to the 
subjective and objective tests of General Standard 2, if these facts raise 
doubts in the arbitrator’s mind as to his or her impartiality and 
independence, or would raise justifiable doubts from an objective third 
person’s viewpoint, then the arbitrator does not reach the question of 
disclosure as he or she would be required to refuse appointment as 
arbitrator or resign from service.  
– Items on the Green List by definition of the guidelines could not lead 
to disqualification under the objective test set forth in General 
Standard 2, let alone be considered from the eyes of parties as raising 
doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality and/or independence, and 
thus need not be disclosed by an arbitrator.  
b) Relevance of disclosures and non-disclosures 
Disclosure of certain facts or circumstances does not as such disqualify 
an arbitrator.42 As summarized above, with disclosure one is in principle43 in 
the situation where the facts and circumstances do not, from the perspective of 
the arbitrator (or for that matter a reasonable third person), raise doubts as to 
the arbitrator’s independence. An arbitrator considers himself or herself as 
impartial and independent despite the disclosure. The purpose of the disclosure 
is “to allow the parties to judge whether they agree with the evaluation of the 
arbitrator and, if they so wish, to explore the situation further”.44 The 
disclosure itself does not demonstrate doubts sufficient to disqualify the 
arbitrator nor does it create “a presumption in favour of disqualification”.45 
This exact wording is included in the guidelines in order to eliminate the 
                                                     
41  See section IV.F.b) below and discussion of General Standard 4(c). 
42  Explanation to General Standard 3(c).  
43  An exception exists for the items which are or should be in the waivable Red List. Here a 
conflict is presumed but it is of a nature that it can be waived by the parties although only 
with an explicit waiver declaration; see General Standard 4(c).  
44  Explanation to General Standard 3(c). 
45  Explanation to General Standard 3(c). 
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misconception “that disclosure itself implies doubts sufficient to disqualify the 
arbitrator.”46 
In addition, as maintained from the 2004 Guidelines and now further 
made clear in the Explanation to General Standard 3(c), “a failure to disclose 
certain facts and circumstances that may, in the eyes of the parties, give rise 
to doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, does not 
necessarily mean that a conflict of interest exists, or that a disqualification 
should ensue.” This clear wording should prevent, what is sometimes 
perceived, that the disclosure of facts that would in the eyes of the parties give 
doubts to impartiality and independence as such equates to a lack of 
impartiality or independence on the part of the disclosing arbitrator. This 
assumption is not correct, rather the standard as elaborated above remains to 
be tested – i.e. whether from an objective third person the facts or 
circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts.  
c) Advance waivers and their impact on an arbitrator’s duty of 
disclosure 
The 2014 Guidelines newly address the concept known in practice as 
advance waivers. In recent years, this phenomenon emerges in particular from 
arbitrators who work at larger law firms. The practice involves such arbitrators 
submitting in “advance” to the arising of a potential conflict of interest a waiver 
for the parties to sign prior to the arbitrator accepting his or her appointment. 
Such type of waivers may take on various forms but typically amount to a request 
for advance clearance from the parties to the effect that the acceptance of the 
arbitral appointment will not inhibit other lawyers from the same law firm from 
acting for or against any party involved in the arbitration, so long as such separate 
mandate is unrelated to the arbitration.47 The potential benefits seen with 
advance waivers is that it allows parties access to highly competent arbitrators 
with a sufficient administrative support to handle large and document-intensive 
cases who may otherwise be excluded from the pool of available arbitrators due 
to their affiliation with a larger law firm.48 The downside seen with the use of 
                                                     
46  Explanation to General Standard 3(c).  
47  Explanation to General Standard 3(b): “Advance waivers” are described as “declarations in 
respect of facts or circumstances that may arise in the future, and the possible conflicts of 
interest that may result [therefrom]”. 
48  Additional arguments in favor of advance waivers can include “that such waivers are, as a 
practical matter, necessary in matters involving members of large law firms who serve as 
arbitrators in international commercial matters. Conflicts checks are snapshots at a 
particular moment in time, and it may be unrealistic to expect that a lawyer/arbitrator will 
be able to conduct daily conflicts updates to review and describe new matters not personally 
involving him or her and that in fact pose no threat to neutrality”. James H. Carter and John 
ARTICLES 
18 33 ASA BULLETIN 1/2015 (MARCH) 
such waivers is that it could constitute a so-called “blanket approval” for any 
future conflict of interest situation which is not in the interest of the party 
granting such approval.  
Because of the disadvantage mentioned, advance waivers are 
controversial. It therefore depends on the applicable legal system whether such 
waivers can validly be granted or not and what their effect and scope would 
be. The 2014 Guidelines themselves have not addressed this precise issue and 
do not set standards as to when such advance waivers should be considered 
valid. Rather they provide that this issue must be assessed in view of the 
specific text of the advance declaration or waiver, the particular circumstances 
at hand, and the applicable law.49 The 2014 Guidelines do however make clear 
that advance waivers do not diminish an arbitrator’s obligation to disclose facts 
and circumstances which, in the eyes of the parties, give rise to doubts as to 
his or her impartiality or independence under General Standard 3(a).50  
B. Disclosure Responsibilities of Parties 
a) Duty to reveal information of an existing relationship 
Pursuant to General Standard 7(a), parties are required to inform all 
relevant persons involved in the arbitration of “any relationship, direct or 
indirect, between the arbitrator and the party (or another company of the same 
group of companies, or an individual having a controlling influence on the 
party in the arbitration), or between the arbitrator and any person or entity 
with a direct economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the award 
to be rendered in the arbitration.”  
Thus, the 2014 Guidelines, as their predecessor, dispel the notion that 
the duty to check for and disclose possible conflicts of interest, if any, falls 
solely on the arbitrator. It can be often the case that – especially when large 
companies with complex group of companies’ structures are involved – it is 
the parties themselves who are in possession of more information. This is 
particularly the case with respect to information that concerns the existence of 
parties who may have some relation to the arbitrator. As such, pursuant to 
reformulated General Standard 7(a), the parties themselves are called upon to 
put forward the existence of a relationship between the arbitrator and the party, 
                                                     
V.H. Pierce, “2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration”, in 
New York Law Journal, 17 November 2014, p. 2. 
49  Explanation to General Standard 3(b). 
50  General Standard 3(b).  
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which – with the revision – also includes in the definition of “party” any 
“individual having a controlling influence on the party in the arbitration.”  
With the 2014 revision, the list of examples as to when this duty would 
arise has been expanded to beyond the group of companies situation to now 
also require disclosure of relationships between the arbitrator, and “any person 
or entity with direct economic interest in the award”, i.e. third-party funders,51 
or any person with “a duty to indemnify a party to the arbitration”. In the 
opinion of the authors of this article, it seems logical that this burden rests on 
the shoulders of the parties since they are the ones who would more likely be 
aware of contractual relationships that exist in the surroundings of the dispute. 
Finally, the newly formulated General Standard 7(a) makes clear that 
the parties have to provide the necessary information on their own initiative 
and as quickly as possible.  
b) Duty to reveal names of members of counsel and relationship to 
arbitrator 
According to General Standard 7(b), parties are also required to inform 
all relevant persons involved in the arbitration of “the identity of its counsel 
appearing in the arbitration, as well as of any relationship, including 
membership of the same barristers’ chambers, between its counsel and the 
arbitrator.” 
This is an entirely new provision which reflects the focus of discussion 
not only on the relationship between the arbitrator and the parties themselves 
but also on the relationship between the arbitrator and the parties’ counsel. 
Another goal of this provision was to address the potential situation where new 
members of a party’s legal team are added in an effort to create a conflict with 
the already composed arbitral tribunal. In order to avoid any “surprise” effect 
to such an ill-intended strategy, parties are required on their own initiative and 
at the “the earliest opportunity” to inform of any changes in the members of 
its legal representation.52  
C. Duty to Conduct Reasonable Enquiries 
a) Duty of the arbitrators 
General Standard 7(d) provides that “[a]n arbitrator is under a duty to 
make reasonable enquiries to identify any conflict of interest, as well as any 
facts or circumstances that may reasonably give rise to doubts as to his or her 
                                                     
51  See below section IV.D.b) for revision to the 2004 Guidelines to address third-party funders. 
52  General Standard 7(b). 
ARTICLES 
20 33 ASA BULLETIN 1/2015 (MARCH) 
impartiality or independence. Failure to disclose a conflict is not excused by 
lack of knowledge, if the arbitrator does not perform such reasonable 
enquiries”.  
The 2014 Guidelines impose a duty to enquire both on the arbitrators 
and on the parties and harmonizes the standard according to which such 
searches need to be conducted.53 That being, both parties and arbitrators have 
an obligation to conduct “reasonable enquiries”.54 The 2014 Guidelines leave 
open what should be considered a “reasonable” enquiry and do not clarify how 
much time and effort needs to be invested in the investigation. What is a 
“reasonable enquiry” will of course depend on the circumstances of a given 
case (i.e., the complexity of the given arbitration, the amount in dispute, its 
expected duration, size and resources of the parties involved) including the 
resources or methods employed to conduct the enquiry. 
According to the previous wording of this General Standard, arbitrators 
were required to “make reasonable enquiries to investigate any potential 
conflict of interest”.55 This phrasing could be misunderstood as only requiring 
an arbitrator to examine a potential conflict of interest which is already on his 
or her mind, and not to enquire whether in fact there exists any other potential 
conflict of interest. Replacing the term “investigate” by “identify” makes 
certain that an arbitrator needs to not only check those conflicts which may or 
may not be in the forefront of his or her mind, but also to identify, i.e. search 
for, additional potential conflicts of interest, thereafter disclosing any such 
conflicts of interest which may exist. 
As to the scope of information to include in the arbitrator’s enquiry, the 
Explanation to General Standard 7(d) establishes that like parties,56 arbitrators 
are required to investigate “any relevant information that is reasonably 
available to them.”57 For example, where an arbitrator has left his or her firm, 
he or she may no longer have “reasonably available” relevant information on 
the relationship between the firm and one of the parties or counsel. General 
Standard 7(d) also reformulates and confirms what was already contained in 
the previous edition of the guidelines that any lack of knowledge will not be 
considered an excuse “if the arbitrator does not perform such reasonable 
enquiries”.58 
                                                     
53  See below section IV.C.b) and clarified duty of parties. 
54  General Standards 7(c) and (d). 
55  General Standard 7(c) of the 2004 Guidelines. 
56  See section IV.C.b) below and clarified duty of parties. 
57  Explanation to General Standard 7(d). 
58  General Standard 7(c).  
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b) Duty of the parties 
General Standard 7(c) requires that “[i]n order to comply with General 
Standard 7(a)”, i.e. a party’s duty to inform all relevant parties of any 
relationship between the arbitrator and the party, a party shall be obliged to 
conduct “reasonable enquiries and provide any relevant information 
available to it”. 
As indicated above, the 2014 revision aligns the standard for the scope 
of enquiries to be performed by parties with the standard also imposed on 
arbitrators.59 As also highlighted above, the misconception that parties only 
had a duty to enquire to an attenuated extent is washed away by the plain 
language of the 2014 Guidelines. In particular, the revisions to the now General 
Standard 7(c) include the removal of the limitation of the scope of the search 
to that which was only “publicly available.” Instead, with the revision, the 
focus is on any relevant information available to a party – i.e. whether publicly 
or privately accessible. Thus, the range of information which needs to be 
searched would also cover information that the party may only know of 
internally at its organization, for example. With that said, the enquiry must 
nevertheless be reasonable, and the 2014 Guidelines do not foresee the need 
for parties to undertake overly burdensome attempts to investigate potential 
conflicts of an arbitrator.  
A party’s duty to investigate any relevant information reasonably 
available to it is a continual obligation throughout the arbitration.60  
The 2014 Guidelines are silent as to what would be the repercussions 
for a party who does not conduct reasonable enquiries pursuant to General 
Standard 7(c). In particular, whether a party may still challenge an arbitrator 
when such party failed to perform a reasonable enquiry which would have 
allowed it to learn the facts or circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts 
as to the arbitrator’s impartiality and independence, remains unanswered by 
the 2014 Guidelines, and will have to be answered by the law applicable to 
the issue.61  
                                                     
59  Pursuant to 2014 General Standard 7(d) and 2004 General Standard 7(c) – as already set out 
in the 2004 Guidelines and reconfirmed with the 2014 revision. 
60  Explanation of General Standard 7(c) (A party is required to make such reasonable enquiries 
not only at the outset but also “on an ongoing basis during the entirety of the proceedings”). 
61  See e.g. in England, according to Section 73 of the Arbitration Act 1996, “[i]f a party to 
arbitral proceedings takes part, or continues to take part, in the proceedings without making, 
either forthwith or within such time as is allowed by the arbitration agreement or the tribunal 
or by any provision of this Part, any objection […] (d) that there has been any other 
irregularity affecting the tribunal or the proceedings, he may not raise that objection later, 
before the tribunal or the court, unless he shows that, at the time he took part or continued to 
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D. Conflicts Based on Relationships between Parties/Counsel 
and Arbitrators 
a) Repeat appointments as arbitrator or engagements of an 
arbitrator (or his/her law firm) 
A recurrent topic in the discussion of conflicts of interest is the issue of 
repeat appointments of an arbitrator by one of the parties,62 or similarly the 
repeat engagement of an arbitrator, or the arbitrator’s law firm, for one of the 
parties.63 These conflicts are based on the notion that repeat appointments or 
                                                     
take part in the proceedings, he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered the grounds for the objection”. In Switzerland, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court 
has held that according to the principle of good faith, the parties are required to conduct a 
reasonable enquiry, failing which they forfeit their right to rely on the circumstances in order 
to bring a challenge of the arbitrator (DFT 136 III 605, section 3.2.2, 129 III 445, section 
4.2.2.1). In Switzerland, this duty, which has been referred to as the “devoir de curiosité”, also 
exists where the arbitrator was nominated by an arbitral institution (DFT 4A_506/2007, section 
3.1.2). In comparison, in Germany, according to Section 1037 ZPO Zivilprozessordnung 
(German Code of Civil Procedure) (free translation), “if not agreed upon otherwise, a party 
who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming aware of any circumstances referred to 
in section 1036 para. 2 ZPO, send a written statement of the reasons for the challenge to the 
arbitral tribunal”. In Germany, actual knowledge and not merely constructed knowledge is 
required (see Münch in Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, 3rd edition 2008, 
section 1037 margin no. 12). Thus, unlike in England and Switzerland, German law seems to 
allow a party to bring a challenge of an arbitrator once it becomes aware of circumstances 
calling into question the arbitrator’s impartiality and independence, irrespective of whether 
such party conducted an enquiry which would have allowed it to discover the ground for the 
objection.  
62  As with the 2004 Guidelines, under Practical Application item 3.1.3, it is an Orange List 
item if “[t]he arbitrator has, within the past three years, been appointed as arbitrator on 
two or more occasions by one of the parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties.” Footnote 5 
to the 2014 Guidelines now mentions explicitly sports arbitration, a field which has heavily 
increased in the past years (thanks in particular to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 
in Lausanne, Switzerland). However, due to the specificities of this field, the pool of 
individuals nominated as arbitrators remains especially small, making the probability of 
multiple appointments in a short time period quite likely and therefore in such instances not 
requiring disclosure of this fact when all parties in the arbitration should be familiar with 
such custom and practice. As maintained from the 2004 Guidelines, under Practical 
Application item 3.1.5, it is an Orange List item if “[t]he arbitrator currently serves, or has 
served within the past three years, as arbitrator in another arbitration involving one of the 
parties or an affiliate of one of the parties.” 
63  As set forth in the 2004 Guidelines, under Practical Application item 3.1.1, it is an Orange 
List item if “[t]he arbitrator has, within the past three years, served as counsel for one of 
the parties […] but the arbitrator and the party, or the affiliate of the party, have no ongoing 
relationship” (emphasis added). Similarly, according to Practical Application item 3.1.4, it 
is an Orange List item if “[t]he arbitrator’s law firm has, within the past three years, acted 
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instructions signify a sort of ongoing working relationship between the party 
and the arbitrator concerned which may influence the arbitrator’s judgment 
during the pending arbitration.  
The 2014 Guidelines also introduced a similar conflict of interest caused 
by the repeat engagement of an arbitrator’s law firm against one of the parties.64 
This addition stems from the idea that such previous involvement could mean 
that the arbitrator, through his or her firm, could gain knowledge of sensitive 
information concerning such party, or have access to preconceived opinions of 
the party (of its conduct, strategy, etc.). As their predecessor, the 
2014 Guidelines also raise caution where it is the arbitrator who has acted against 
one of the parties.65 In support of this Orange List item is the notion that if the 
arbitrator has acted on multiple occasions against one of the parties, he or she 
may be predisposed against that party’s interest. 
The above categories of conflict are dealt with specifically in the 
Practical Application lists. As seen also in other contexts, the Practical 
Application lists use a time period of three years as a guiding point for 
measuring a potential conflict. Although during the revision process there was 
much discussion among members of the Subcommittee as to whether to extend 
this time period from three years to five years, the three-year time limitation 
relevant to measure the repeat appointments or engagements in the 
2004 Guidelines withstood the revision process. This solution is to be 
welcomed as it takes into account the danger of opening the door to 
unwarranted challenges, and the fact that a five-year time period would limit 
the pool of available arbitrators. Thus, as a result, if the circumstances occurred 
                                                     
for or against one of the parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties, in an unrelated matter 
without the involvement of the arbitrator” (emphasis added). 
64  New with the 2014 Guidelines is Practical Application item 3.1.4, which includes as an 
Orange List item instances where “[t]he arbitrator’s law firm has, within the past three 
years, acted for or against one of the parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties, in an 
unrelated matter without the involvement of the arbitrator” (emphasis added). 
65  Practical Application item 3.1.2 confirms as an Orange List item instances where the 
“arbitrator has, within the past three years, served as counsel against one of the parties, or 
an affiliate of one of the parties, in an unrelated matter” (emphasis added). In its decision 
dated 6 October 2008 (DFT 135 I 14 section 4.3), involving a domestic arbitration, the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court confirmed an appearance of lack of independence – from an 
objective perspective – where a chairman acted as counsel to a party in another lawsuit 
against one of the parties to the arbitration. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court observed that 
parties have the tendency to associate counsel with the party who he or she represents. 
Therefore, in the eyes of a party, it cannot be expected of the chairman to be suddenly 
independent and remain free of any preconceived opinions.  
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more than three years prior to the arbitrator’s current appointment, it is as a 
general rule not mandatory for the arbitrator to disclose such facts.66  
b) Third-party funding, insurers and indemnifiers 
The use of third-party funding in arbitration from professional third-
party funders, banks, insurances, etc., has dramatically increased since the 
issuance of the 2004 Guidelines, without however being regulated on an 
international level (or at least very rarely).67 As seen from the responses 
received from the questionnaire circulated at the start of the review process,68 
this topic is one that the arbitration community views as important and is an 
area in need of guidance.  
In the 2014 Guidelines, third-party funding is dealt with in the revisions 
to the General Standards as well as in the Practical Application lists. In General 
Standard 6(b), now included in the definition of a party, is any legal or physical 
person having “a direct economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party 
for, the award to be rendered in the arbitration.”69 In addition, General 
Standard 7(a) requires parties to disclose any relationship between an arbitrator 
and “any person or entity with a direct economic interest in, or a duty to 
indemnify a party for, the award to be rendered in the arbitration.”70 The 
Explanation to General Standard 7(a) attempts to help define what is meant by 
“direct economic interest” and provides as an example a relationship with an 
entity providing funding for the arbitration.71 Third-party funding is also 
addressed in the Practical Application lists, which were revised in two 
                                                     
66  This is a general rule, see paragraph 6 to Part II of the 2014 Guidelines explaining that 
“[b]ecause the Orange List is a non-exhaustive list of examples, there may be situations not 
mentioned, which, depending on the circumstances, may need to be disclosed by an 
arbitrator. Such may be the case, for example, in the event of repeat past appointments by 
the same party or the same counsel beyond the three-year period provided for in the Orange 
List.” Notably, some consider the three-year time period to be too short. See James H. Carter 
and John V.H. Pierce, “2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration”, in New York Law Journal, 17 November 2014, p.2 (“[…] the AAA/ABA Code 
and U.S. case law do not contain such time limitations on disclosure and that U.S. 
arbitrators generally would not restrict such a disclosure to events or relationships during 
the last three years.” “Some U.S. lawyers […] have suggested that the Guidelines set the 
bar too low […]”).  
67  See e.g. Selvyn Seidel, “Third-Party Investing in International Arbitration Claims: To Invest 
or Not to Invest? A Daunting Question?” in ICC October 2013; Bernado Cremades, “Third 
Party Litigation Funding: Investing in Arbitration”, in Transnational Dispute Management, 
Vol. 8 Issue 4 (October 2011). 
68  See section I above. 
69  General Standard 6(b). 
70  General Standard 7(a). 
71  Explanation to General Standard 7(a). 
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instances in order to take into account “an entity that has direct economic 
interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration.”72  
The use of the terms “third-party funder” and “insurer” as used in the 
2014 Guidelines is meant to refer to “any person or entity that is contributing 
funds, or other material support, to the prosecution or defense of the case and 
that has a direct economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the 
award to be rendered in the arbitration.”73 Third-party funding, in general, 
includes funding towards fees and expenses of counsel, as well as funding for 
arbitrator fees, costs of investigation, document production and review as well 
as hearing expenses.74  
The discussion in the 2014 Guidelines is not limited to third-party 
funders but also extends to other third actors who have an interest in the 
arbitration and whose very presence creates similar conflict concerns (i.e. 
including third parties with a duty to indemnify one of the parties “for the 
award to be rendered in the arbitration”).75 These are persons who may not 
be per se funding the arbitration but who have a “direct economic interest” 
since they will, based on a contractual relationship or in law, hold harmless 
one of the parties in case of an unfavorable award (i.e. will pay on behalf of 
the losing party). 
The involvement of third-party funders, insurers, or indemnifiers in a 
proceeding is relevant since it injects additional and often varying interests into 
the arbitration which may or may not give rise to conflicts with the arbitrators. 
The conflict, if present would arise not from the fact that there is a third party 
providing financing of the proceedings. Rather, the potential conflict stems 
                                                     
72  See Practical Application Red List item 1.2 (“The arbitrator is a manager, director or 
member of the supervisory board, or has a controlling influence on one of the parties or an 
entity that has direct economic interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration”) and 
Practical Application Orange List item 3.4.3 (“A close personal friendship exists between 
an arbitrator and a manager or director or a member of the supervisory board: of a party; 
of an entity that has a direct economic interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration; 
or any person having a controlling influence, such as a controlling shareholder interest, on 
one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties or a witness or expert”). 
73  Explanation to General Standard 6(b).  
74  See Bernado Cremades, “Third Party Litigation Funding: Investing in Arbitration”, in 
Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 8 Issue 4 (October 2011), p. 2. “In essence, third 
party litigation funding is a modern twist on the classic contingency fee agreement, as it 
could be described as a contingent fee offered by non-lawyers. In third party funding, a 
funder covers the costs and expenses of the litigant in consideration of the assignment by 
the latter of a share in any future compensation. […] If the funded litigant loses, the funder 
will lose the investment. However, if the claim is successful, either in litigation or settlement, 
the funder will receive a portion or percentage of the recovery.” Id.  
75  General Standard 6(b) and Explanation to General Standard 6(b).  
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from the involvement of a third person in the dispute with a direct financial 
stake in the outcome, which means that potential concerns with regard to 
relationships between the arbitrator and counsel extend to this third party, and 
thus whose presence could influence, or appear to influence, an arbitrator’s 
decision-making.  
c) Enmity between the arbitrator and the parties and/or counsel 
The 2014 Guidelines introduce an entirely new category of relationship 
which considers whether enmity exists between the arbitrator and counsel 
appearing in the arbitration.76 This requires the arbitrator to take into 
consideration whether he or she holds any grudges against the counsel due to 
previous dealings with him or her, or for any other reason. A similar standard 
is applied for situations where enmity exists between an arbitrator and a 
manager or director or a member of the supervisory board of a party, of an 
entity that has a direct economic interest in the award, or of any person having 
a controlling influence in one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties 
or a witness or expert.77 
Although this addition could be considered an interesting development, 
one would wonder whether this would be a piece of information which an 
arbitrator is willing to disclose since once the information is released into the 
small community of international arbitration practitioners, it is difficult to 
retrieve. Thus, it is unlikely that this new circumstance will have a high 
practical impact.  
d) Relationship as co-counsel 
According to the 2014 Guidelines, an arbitrator must disclose whether 
he or she and another arbitrator or counsel for one of the parties in the 
arbitration “currently act or have acted together within the past three years as 
co-counsel”.78 Within the practice of international arbitration, this scenario 
occurs more often than one would consider.  
                                                     
76  Practical Application Orange List item 3.3.7 (“Enmity exists between an arbitrator and 
counsel appearing in the arbitration”).  
77  Practical Application Orange List item 3.4.4 (“Enmity exists between an arbitrator and a 
manager or director or a member of the supervisory board of: a party; an entity that has a 
direct economic interest in the award; or any person having a controlling influence in one 
of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties or a witness or expert”). 
78  What was formerly Practical Application Green List item 4.4.2 of the 2004 Guidelines, “The 
arbitrator and counsel for one of the parties or another arbitrator have previously served 
together as arbitrators or as co-counsel”, is now elevated to Orange List status in the 
2014 Guidelines. Practical Application Orange List item 3.3.9 provides that “The arbitrator 
and another arbitrator, or counsel for one of the parties in the arbitration, currently act or 
have acted together within the past three years as co-counsel”.  
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Concerning a concurrent relationship as co-counsel between two of the 
arbitrators, if and when such arbitrators meet as co-counsel on a different 
mandate, they may be viewed as excluding the third arbitrator not present. This 
is particularly the case if the co-counsel relationship is between the president 
of the arbitral tribunal and one of the party-appointed co-arbitrators. As this 
could make the party that has appointed the non-present co-arbitrator uneasy, 
the concurrent relationship among members of the arbitral tribunal as co-
counsel amounts to an Orange List item.  
Concerning a concurrent relationship as co-counsel between one of the 
arbitrators and counsel for one of the parties, similarly a concern arises that 
one of the parties, through its counsel, has greater “access” to one of the 
arbitrators which the other side does not, therefore also warranting an Orange 
List classification. 
During the revision process, discussion arose among the members of the 
Subcommittee as to whether only past relationships and not also current 
relationships between the arbitrator and another arbitrator or counsel for one 
of the parties should be disclosed. With regard to a past co-counsel relationship 
between an arbitrator and another arbitrator, or counsel for one of the parties, 
the issue of access to information or ex parte communication among members 
of the arbitral tribunal is not present since the co-counsel relationship has 
ended. Thus, with respect to co-counsel relationships of the past, the possible 
concern of the drafters might have been to have disclosed any financial interest 
that an arbitrator (himself or herself) derives from acting as co-counsel with 
the arbitrator or counsel involved in the proceedings. 
e) Arbitrator and ties to appointing authority 
The revision also introduces the necessity to disclose the fact that an 
arbitrator holds a position with the appointing authority in a committee, court, 
organ or body of an arbitral institution that has the appointing authority over 
the dispute.79 
It should be pointed out that the institutions themselves contain 
restrictions as to the possibility of being appointed by the institution while 
someone has an official role in such institution. Thus, this new situation 
addresses the perceived need of transparency of such set of circumstances.  
f) Relationship through social groups or social media 
The revisers considered the situation where one person on a social 
media list is an arbitrator in proceedings where counsel to the parties is also 
                                                     
79  Practical Application Orange List item 3.5.3 (“The arbitrator holds a position with the 
appointing authority with respect to the dispute”). 
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a member of the same list. The revisers looked into this issue since it has 
within the last decade been more frequently used to challenge the impartiality 
and independence of arbitrators. Upon reflection, the Subcommittee 
considered that if an arbitrator has a relationship with another arbitrator or 
counsel for one of the parties through membership in the same professional 
association or social or charitable organization, or through a social media 
network, this relationship will in terms of the 2014 Guidelines be considered 
a Green List item.80  
As a result, no disclosure is required of such facts and circumstances and 
the relationship alone cannot be grounds for calling into question an 
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. Similarly, it is also a Green List item 
if the arbitrator has a relationship with one of the parties or its affiliates through 
a social media network.81  
g) Relationship through academia, conferences or seminars 
According to the 2014 Guidelines, no doubts should be raised as to an 
arbitrator’s impartiality and independence in cases where he or she teaches in 
the same faculty or school as another arbitrator or counsel for one of the parties, 
or serves as an officer of a professional association, or social or charitable 
organization, with another arbitrator or counsel for one of the parties.82  
Also included as a Green List item are instances where the arbitrator was 
a speaker, moderator or organizer in one or more conferences, or participated 
in seminars or working parties of a professional, social or charitable 
organization, with another arbitrator or counsel to the parties.83  
                                                     
80  Practical Application Green List item 4.3.1 (“The arbitrator has a relationship with another 
arbitrator, or with the counsel for one of the parties, through membership in the same 
professional association, or social or charitable organisation, or through a social media 
network”). The addition of “charitable organisation” covers organizations such as the 
Lion’s Club with over 1.3 million members, of which many lawyers are members, and which 
serves as basis for networking. Networks such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Xing fall under 
“social media” aspects of item 4.3.1. 
81  Practical Application Green List item 4.4.4 (“The arbitrator has a relationship with one of 
the parties or its affiliates through a social media network”).  
82  Practical Application Green List item 4.3.3 (“The arbitrator teaches in the same faculty or 
school as another arbitrator or counsel to one of the parties, or serves as an officer of a 
professional association or social or charitable organisation with another arbitrator or 
counsel for one of the parties”). 
83  Practical Application Green List item 4.3.4 (“The arbitrator was a speaker, moderator or 
organiser in one or more conferences, or participated in seminars or working parties of a 
professional, social or charitable organisation, with another arbitrator or counsel to the 
parties”). 
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h) Relationship with partner of the same firm as arbitrator 
As with the 2004 Guidelines, the 2014 Guidelines address the 
contemporary problems in the world of large corporate groups/complex 
structures of multinational corporations and international multi-office law 
firms/globalization of international law firms. Pursuant to the revisions to 
General Standard 6(a), “[t]he arbitrator is in principle considered to bear 
the identity of his or her law firm”. According to the same provision, and to 
the question as to whether a disclosure should be made, the activities of the 
arbitrator’s firm, if any, should be reasonably considered in each individual 
case and shall not automatically constitute a conflict of interest or a reason 
for disclosure. Each situation must be considered on its own facts – 
disqualification occurs only if it is objectively justified under General 
Standard 2.84  
i) Relationship between barristers of the same chambers 
The traditional position as understood under English law is that 
barristers from the same chambers can be appointed as both arbitrators and 
counsel in the same arbitration without calling into question the impartiality or 
independence of the arbitrator.85 However, recent case law and decisions of 
leading arbitral institutions have indicated a trend towards a less tolerant 
approach to the appointment of arbitrators and counsel from the same 
chambers.86 With the revision to the 2004 Guidelines, the Subcommittee 
looked into the treatment of the relationship among members of the same 
barristers’ chambers under the 2004 Guidelines and considered whether there 
was need for any revisions. 
                                                     
84  General Standard 6(a). 
85  See David W. Brown, “Arbitrators, Impartiality and English Law – Did Rix J. really get it 
wrong in Laker Airways?”, in Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 18 Issue 1 (2001), 
pp. 123-130 (discussing leading English decision Laker Airways Inc. v. FLS Aerospace Ltd 
rendered on 20 April 1999, in which it was held that the fact that a barrister-arbitrator was a 
member of the same set of chambers as an advocate representing one of the parties was not 
itself considered sufficient to constitute a conflict of interest or to justify doubts as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality under Section 24 of the Arbitration Act 1996; and the Departmental 
Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law Report, which provides that “[…] it is often the 
case that one member of a barrister’s Chambers appears as counsel before an arbitrator 
who comes from the same Chambers. Is that to be regarded, without more, as a lack of 
independence justifying the removal of the arbitrator? We are quite certain that this would 
not be the case in English Law.” (Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law 
Report, February 1996, at 119)).  
86  Berwin Leighton Paisner survey of opinions on the practice of having arbitrators and 
advocates from the same set of barristers’ chambers (surveying sixty-nine law firms from 
forty-eight countries).  
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As maintained from the 2004 Guidelines, in the 2014 Guidelines there 
is no blanket ban on the members of the same chambers appearing as counsel 
and arbitrator in the same case.87 However, with the introduction of General 
Standard 7(b), a party shall disclose the identity of its counsel appearing in the 
arbitration “as well as of any relationship, including membership of the same 
barristers’ chambers, between its counsel and the arbitrator”. Other additions 
introduced in the 2014 Guidelines also make clear that “[a]lthough barristers’ 
chambers should not be equated with law firms for the purposes of conflicts 
[…] disclosure may be warranted in view of the relationships among 
barristers, parties or counsel.”88 Thus, although “no general standard is 
proffered for barristers’ chambers”,89 with the modifications introduced by the 
2014 Guidelines, if the relationship among barristers is comparable to those of 
members of law firms, the same rules may apply. 
E. Conflicts Based on Subject Matter (“Issue Conflicts”) 
An “issue conflict” is commonly understood as a situation where an 
arbitrator has a connection/relationship to the issue before him/her and not – 
as normally the case in conflict of interest discussions – to one of the parties, 
counsel or another arbitrator.90 Thus, it does not concern a relationship with a 
person/entity but with the particular issues of the case before the arbitrator. The 
problem of issue conflicts arises particularly in the context of investment-treaty 
arbitration but it is not exclusive to it.  
Issue conflicts can arise in different ways, which include but are not 
limited to the following scenarios: 
– The arbitrator can have the same/a similar issue before him/her in 
another arbitration proceeding. This other arbitration can be either in 
the past and terminated or still ongoing. 
                                                     
87  Practical Application Orange List item 3.3.2 (“The arbitrator and another arbitrator or the 
counsel for one of the parties are members of the same barristers’ chambers”). 
88  Explanation to General Standard 6(a). 
89  Explanation to General Standard 6(a). 
90  See Michael Hwang and Kevin Lim “Issue Conflict in ICSID Arbitrations” in 
Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 8 Issue 5 (December 2011), pp. 17-18; Jan 
Paulsson, “Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility”, in Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 14 
Issue 4 (1997), pp. 14-15; Gary Born, “International Commercial Arbitration”, Vol. II, 
§12.05, p. 1884. 
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– The arbitrator can have had a similar issue to deal with as a counsel.91 
Again, the case in which the arbitrator has been a counsel might be 
in the past or still ongoing. 
– The issue might have been raised outside the context of another 
arbitration proceeding.92 This is particularly the case if the arbitrator 
has expressed his or her view on an issue which is also at stake in the 
arbitration, in a publication, such as an academic journal. 
The issue at stake is whether or not some of these situations which are 
summarized above raise concerns and, from a reasonable third parties’ point 
of view, have an impact on the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator.  
Within the members of the Subcommittee, there was no unanimity of 
views. While some wanted to have a strict approach and include issue conflicts 
in the Orange List, if not in the non-waivable Red List, others considered this 
as less critical, mainly comparing the situation to State judges where this has 
not given rise to similar concerns. 
Finally, the agreed result was to not expressly address the issue in the 
General Standards or as one of the Practical Application list items, but to 
instead make reference to it in paragraph 6 of the introductory paragraphs to 
the Practical Application lists. Paragraph 6 of Part II of the 2014 Guidelines 
now includes the following sentence: “Because the Orange List is a non-
exhaustive list of examples, there may be situations not mentioned, which, 
depending on the circumstances, may need to be disclosed by an arbitrator. 
Such may be the case, for example, […] when an arbitrator concurrently acts 
as counsel in an unrelated case in which similar issues of law are raised.”  
There are several conclusions which can be drawn from this solution in 
the 2014 Guidelines: 
(i) First of all, the relevant provision only mentions the relationship 
between the same issue at stake for an arbitrator and a counsel. 
Therefore, by negative inference, it seems less critical if the same 
issue appears in a situation in which the arbitrator has already dealt 
with the same issue as an arbitrator in a previous case. 
                                                     
91  Challenge No. 13/2004, Petition No. HA/RK 2004.667, Decision of the District Court of 
The Hague of 18 October 2004; Challenge No. 17/2004, Petition No. HA/RK 2004.788, 
Decision of the District Court of The Hague of 5 November 2004. 
92  In Urbaser v Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB07/26), a challenge against Campbell 
McLachlan based on his academic writings failed. However in Perenco v Ecuador (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/06; PCA Case No. IR-2009/1), the claimant-appointed arbitrator 
Charles Brower was successfully challenged for statements regarding Ecuador’s 
recalcitrant approach to investment-treaty arbitration generally given in an interview to a 
journalist. 
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(ii) A further limitation can be concluded from the word 
“concurrently”. Apparently, the drafters had in mind a situation in 
which the arbitrator could influence the case law and thus 
potentially the outcome of a case where the individual concerned 
acts, at the same time as the arbitration where he/she is appointed 
as arbitrator, as counsel (the issue of “double hats”). Indeed, once 
the latter case is over, there is no threat of a potential impact by the 
former and thus no risk perception of bias any more.  
(iii) The caveat introduced in the 2014 Guidelines is not limited to 
investment-treaty arbitration.  
(iv) It is not necessary that the cases in question are related to one 
another in order to raise concern. 
This paper is not the right place to discuss how far issue conflicts should 
go.93 However, the rather “hands-off” as well as seemingly restrictive approach 
to issue conflicts taken in the 2014 Guidelines is in the opinion of the authors 
justified. Issue conflicts should not be accepted too easily as this can lead to 
the risk of obstructing arbitration proceedings by unwarranted challenges. In 
addition, widely accepting the notion of issue conflicts limits the pool of 
available arbitrators. 
F. Waivers of Conflicts of Interest 
The ability of parties to waive conflicts of interest, and the limits thereof, 
was already a concept recognized in the 2004 Guidelines. The extent to which 
a waiver will be considered valid and respected vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  
For example under Swiss law, in principle no limitation exists on the 
possible waiver of known, and even unknown, facts or circumstances which 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s independence.94 Whereas in 
                                                     
93  See e.g. Anthony Sinclair and Matthew Gearing “Partiality and Issue Conflicts” in 
Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 5 Issue 4 (July 2008), at 2; Caline Mouawad “Issue 
Conflicts in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 5 
Issue 4 (July 2008), at 13; Judith Levine, “Dealing with Arbitrator “Issue Conflicts” in 
International Arbitration”, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 5 Issue 4  
(July 2008). 
94  This is made clear by the fact that parties can, under certain circumstances, waive their right 
to set aside an award. Article 192(1) of the Private International Law Act provides that: 
“Where none of the parties have their domicile, habitual residence or business establishment 
in Switzerland, they may, by an express statement in the arbitration agreement or by a 
subsequent written agreement, waive fully the action for setting aside or they may limit it to 
one or several of the grounds listed in Article 190(2).” Thus, it is considered that if parties 
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other jurisdictions, there can be greater restrictions as to what parties can and 
cannot waive. The 2014 Guidelines, as the 2004 Guidelines, cater to this legal 
diversity by reflecting the limits to the ability to “waive” which exists in some 
jurisdictions.  
a) Non-waivable issues 
With the 2014 revision, General Standard 4(b) confirms that, as with the 
2004 Guidelines, in certain instances there can be no waiver of a conflict at all. 
This is the case if facts or circumstances exist as described in the non-waivable 
Red List.  
General Standard 4(b) also includes the position of the 2014 Guidelines 
on the concept of advance waivers, and confirms that even a waiver made in 
writing in advance to a known conflict may not be used to cure the conflict of 
interest of an arbitrator as described in the non-waivable Red List.95  
b) Waivable issues if waiver expressly made 
As in the 2004 Guidelines, General Standard 4(c) provides that in certain 
circumstances, including those exemplified in the waivable Red List, a person 
may only serve as an arbitrator if all parties concerned have full knowledge of 
the conflict of interest and all parties expressly agree to his or her role as 
arbitrator despite the conflict of interest.  
Pursuant to General Standard 4(d), if an arbitrator is to also assist the 
parties with conciliation or mediation at any stage in the proceedings, he or she 
should receive an express agreement by the parties to act in such capacity. 
Taking on such a role by an arbitrator, which is often done in civil law 
                                                     
can waive the right to challenge the award on all grounds, they should a fortiori be entitled 
to waive the more limited right to challenge an arbitrator. However, this seemingly clear 
situation might be influenced by the professional rules applicable to a lawyer, and in 
particular by the Statute on the Free Movement of Lawyers within Switzerland 
(“Bundesgesetz über die Freizügigkeit der Anwältinnen und Anwälte” (BGFA), SR 935.61) 
providing that a lawyer must remain free of conflicts (Article 12(c)). Whether or not 
arbitrators fall under these rules and what the limitations are to advance waivers under Swiss 
professional rules is not settled (see Kaspar Schiller, Schweizerisches Anwaltsrecht, 2009, 
para. 348, citing a decision of the Lawyers of the Canton of Zurich Supervisory Board dated 
7 September 2001 in ASA Bull. 2001, pp. 313 et seq.). Notably, some Swiss commentators 
take the view that since a client may waive his or her attorney privilege rights (Article 321 
Swiss Criminal Code and Article 13 BGFA), then it should also be possible to waive one’s 
right to an arbitrator free of any conflicts (Kaspar Schiller, Schweizerisches Anwaltsrecht, 
2009, para. 828). 
95  See section IV.A.c) above for more details on the concept of advance waivers. Advance 
waivers are a form of express waivers envisioned under General Standards 4(c) and 4(d). 
Any attempt to obtain an advance waiver cannot circumvent the mandatory limits that apply 
to waivers as discussed in General Standard 4(b). 
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countries, is something recognized in the guidelines, and acting in such a 
manner should not per se disqualify an arbitrator from continuing to serve. The 
arbitrator shall however resign should, as a result of his or her involvement in 
the settlement process, he or she develop doubts as to his or her ability to 
remain impartial and independent.  
c) Waivable issues even if waiver implicitly made 
General Standard 4(a) provides that if “within 30 days after receipt of 
any disclosure by the arbitrator” or “after a party otherwise learns of facts or 
circumstances that could constitute a potential conflict of interest for an 
arbitrator” a party does not raise an express objection, the party is “deemed to 
have waived any potential conflict of interest in respect of the arbitrator based 
on such facts or circumstances”.  
The language of General Standard 4(a) remains almost identical to its 
2004 version. The purpose of this provision is to allow, as is consistent in many 
jurisdictions, for implicit waivers of a conflict where there is no express 
objection made within a reasonable period of time.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
To summarize, the basic principles which made the 2004 Guidelines so 
popular and widely accepted endured the revision process and remain the 
same. It follows that new features were added only where it was felt necessary 
(in particular based on input by various categories of users) in view of 
developments in the past decade. These features include specifically effects of 
so-called “advance waivers” of potential conflicts of interest, as well as the 
treatment of third-party funding. As described above, newly addressed with 
the revision – but still left for the most part open – is the topic of conflicts 
based on the subject matter in dispute, i.e. issue conflicts.  
Notably, some additions introduced by the 2014 Guidelines are not clear 
on what the repercussions would be if not implemented by the persons 
concerned. In particular, the new requirement that parties shall disclose “the 
identity of its counsel appearing in the arbitration” and of “any change in its 
counsel team”96 does not include any sanction which would penalize a party 
who fails to disclose changes in its counsel team.97 This is contrary to the 
                                                     
96  General Standard 7(b). 
97  See also on this issues the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International 
Arbitration, Guideline 4 (“Party Representatives should identify themselves […] at the 
earliest opportunity. A Party should promptly inform the Arbitral Tribunal and the other 
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content of the guidelines regarding conflicts as such, which can be sanctioned 
– at least indirectly – through decisions of arbitral institutions and/or state 
courts reflecting the content of the 2014 Guidelines.  
Moreover, while the modifications to the Practical Application lists of 
the 2004 Guidelines did include a greater focus on the relationship between the 
arbitrator and counsel, as compared to that between the arbitrator and the 
parties, the revisions to Part II of the guidelines could still be considered as not 
being comprehensive enough. Indeed, the 2014 revisions for the most part 
concern additions or clarifications to the General Standards (Part I of the 
guidelines). In the view of the authors, it would be worthwhile to focus on the 
Practical Application list items in the next decade by finding a way to record 
recurring issues that were not yet included in the 2014 revision. This would be 
a valuable endeavor since the Practical Application lists could be considered 
as the more widely used portion of the guidelines by arbitrators and arbitration 
practitioners. 
Overall, the result is that there have not been drastic changes and the 
fundamental principles first set out in the 2004 Guidelines remain the same. 
The first reactions to the 2014 Guidelines through the presentations at the 
annual IBA Conference held in Tokyo were positive and it seems that the 
moderate revisions will be well received.  
  
                                                     
Party or Parties of any change in such representation”); http://www.ibanet.org/ 
Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx.  
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Summary 
The present article analyzes the recent revision of the International 
Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration, which were approved by the IBA in late October 2014. First 
introduced in 2004, the guidelines have become an essential tool relied upon 
by arbitration practitioners, institutions and courts when assessing questions 
of impartiality and independence of arbitrators and the extent of disclosure 
requirements.  
The goal of this paper is not only to highlight those aspects of the 
revised guidelines which are new or clarified, but also to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the guidelines as a whole. To that end, the authors 
have identified a number of key topic areas relating to conflicts of interest 
in arbitration which have been the subject of recurring debate and were also 
to a considerable extent at the core of the discussion during the revision 
process. These topic areas serve as a framework to analyze and better 
comprehend the impact of the various provisions of the guidelines.  
In particular, the article addresses in detail the following specific 
subject matters: duties of disclosure and enquiry for arbitrators, 
administrative secretaries and parties, relationship-based conflicts 
(including third-party funding), issue conflicts, and waivers of conflicts of 
interest (including advance waivers). 
 
